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With an incomplete panel data from 63 countries over 25 years this 
paper finds that the average number of employees per entrepreneur in-
creases with the countries’ levels of social capital. This evidence is in 
line with predictions from occupational choice models, where the equi-
librium average size of firms increases with lower internal costs of 
growth, when social capital supported trust reduces these costs facili-
tating the delegation of decision power in firms. We also find that the 
influence of social capital in self-employed rates differs if the self-em-
ployed have employees or not so entrepreneurs should be treated as a 
heterogeneous group.
1 IntroductIon
The rate of self-employed is a common measure of countries’ level of entre-
preneurship (Acs et al., 1994; Blanchflower, 2000).1 It is generally accepted 
that entrepreneurship is an important factor in economic development 
(Audretsch et al., 2006; Carree and Thurik, 2008; Naudé, 2013), so one 
would expect higher self-employment rates in more developed countries 
than in less developed ones. However, since Kuznets (1966), repeated empir-
ical evidence consistently shows just the opposite: the proportion of self- 
employed in the working population decreases as the per capita income of 
countries increases (Gollin, 2008; Gindling and Newhouse, 2014, with data 
1A distinction is made between behavioral and occupational definitions of entrepreneurs. 
Behavioral definitions identify entrepreneurs by their actions: starting a new business, 
introducing innovations, balancing supply and demand (as in the work of Schumpeter 
and Kirzner). Occupational definitions identify entrepreneurs as self-employed people 
with decision and residual rights over their work and the work of others, the employees 
(as in Coase and Lucas). Wennekers et al. (2010) survey research on entrepreneurship as 
self-employment decisions, while Fritsch and Storey (2014) survey the research that iden-
tifies entrepreneurs with the entrepreneurial actions of new firm creations.
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from rich and poor countries; OECD, 2016, with data from developed coun-
tries only). If the number of entrepreneurs approximately matches the num-
ber of firms, countries with lower self-employment rates will be countries 
with a higher average size of firms. The negative association between 
self-employment rates and per capita income is then consistent with other 
evidence generating increasing interest: the positive association between the 
average size of firms and economic development (Bento and Restuccia, 
2015; Hopenhayn, 2016).
This paper provides an economic explanation, supported with empiri-
cal evidence, of the observed cross-countries differences in self-employment 
rates and in average firm sizes. The explanation is based on Coase’s (1937, 
page 388) definition of the entrepreneur ‘[…] the person or persons who, in 
a competitive system, take the place of the price mechanism in the direc-
tion of resources’, and on the occupational choice theory that explains the 
number of entrepreneurs in the economy as a market equilibrium (Lucas, 
1978). Occupational choice models predict that the equilibrium number of 
entrepreneurs will be lower and the average productivity per entrepreneur 
(employees per entrepreneur) higher in economies with low organizational 
size diseconomies (low marginal management costs) than in economies with 
high organizational size diseconomies (Rosen, 1982). There is also theory 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Aghion et al., 2014) supported by empirical ev-
idence (Bloom et al., 2012; Gur and Bjornskov, 2017) showing that trusts 
favours effective decentralization of decisions in organizations, reducing 
management cost and consequently reducing the internal costs of growth. 
Therefore, trust as facilitator of decentralized organizations creates a link 
between social capital as determinant of trust (Coleman, 1990; Adler and 
Kwon, 2002; Glaeser et al., 2002; Kwon and Adler, 2014) and the number 
and productivity of entrepreneurs in the economy.
A better understanding of why countries differ in the number of the 
self-employed is important for further clarification of the relationship be-
tween entrepreneurship and economic development. The population of 
self-employed includes those self-employed who do not hire employees, the 
solo self-employed, and those self-employed who hire employees, the employ-
ers. Since only the employers properly qualify as Coasian entrepreneurs, 
i.e. as directors of the work of employees, the explanation of the number 
of employers can differ from the explanation of the number of solo self- 
employed. The empirical evidence presented later also justifies the recog-
nition of the self-employed as a heterogeneous group: with data from 62 
countries over 25 years, the proportion of employers in the total occupied 
population is independent of the level of economic development, while the 
proportion of solo self-employed is negatively and significantly associated 
with economic development. The observed negative correlation between 
rates of all self-employed and GDP per capita is then attributed to the neg-
ative association between GDP per capita and rates of solo self-employed.
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The literature on entrepreneurship and economic development has rec-
ognized the importance of considering entrepreneurship as a heterogeneous 
phenomenon, concluding that not all entrepreneurs contribute equally to 
economic development (Lerner and Schoar, 2010; Gindling and Newhouse, 
2014). We claim in this paper that the number and composition of entre-
preneurs as self-employed are endogenously determined, together with the 
level of total economic output. Therefore, entrepreneurship does not ‘cause’ 
economic development, but rather, entrepreneurship and economic devel-
opment both respond to similar exogenous factors.
Data on the number of individuals in the various occupational 
groups, employees, employers and solo self-employed, are taken from the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) database for all countries and 
years in which data are available. Data on social capital come from two 
sources, the IVIE social capital index, SCI, available for a long list of coun-
tries and years (Fernández de Guevara et al., 2015), from the World Values 
Survey (WVS, 2014), and from the European Social Survey (ESS, 2014). The 
SCI measure is based on the economic approach of Glaeser et al. (2002) to 
the measurement of social capital. The data from the WVS and EES are 
direct measures of generalized trust in the countries covered by the surveys. 
The SCI has the advantage of being a panel data that can be matched with 
the panel data on relative sizes of occupational groups, but the evidence on 
how well the index correlates with direct measures of trust is scarce (Pastor 
and Tortosa-Ausina, 2008). The WVS and EES survey data have the advan-
tage that they provide a direct measure of trust, but are available only for 
a limited number of countries and years. Our empirical results support the 
main hypothesis of the paper with both sources, the IVIE and the WVS and 
EES measures of social capital and trust.
Blau (1987), and Evans and Leighton (1989) are early papers on the de-
terminants of the time evolution of self-employment rates in the USA. Acs 
et al. (1994), with data from the same ILO database used in this paper, focus 
their attention on cross-country differences in self-employed rates, as does 
Blanchflower (2000) with data from OECD countries. Fritsch et al. (2015) 
investigate the possible reasons behind the recent strong increase in self- 
employment in Germany. The research interests of all these papers are 
more focused on explaining possible changes in entrepreneurship trends 
over time, rather than in explaining cross-country differences in entrepre-
neurship. They all conclude that variations in self-employment rates re-
spond more to changes in the economic environment (shift of activity from 
manufacturing to services, changes in the distribution of population in age 
cohorts, business cycle, taxation policies, etc.) than to changes in the in-
clination of individuals to be self-employed. Our paper contributes to this 
empirical literature with a theoretical explanation of differences in self- 
employment rates grounded in the theory of occupational choice, and with 
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a yet-unexplored connection between the equilibrium number of entrepre-
neurs and the internal organization of firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the the-
oretical roots of the hypotheses to be tested, together with the connection 
of our work to the related literature. Section 2 presents the data base and 
the formulation of the empirical model. Section 3 presents the empirical 
results on the relationship between social capital and entrepreneurs’ rates 
and productivity. The conclusion summarizes the main results of the paper.
2 theory and related lIterature
2.1 Sizes of occupational Groups and management Costs Diseconomies
The basic theory on the determinants of the number of entrepreneurs as solo 
self-employed in an economy is based on Lucas (1978), on the equilibrium dis-
tribution of firm sizes from the occupational choice of individuals with differ-
ent levels of entrepreneurial skill. The original work, that allows for only two 
occupational groups, employers and employees, is extended in Salas-Fumás 
et al. (2014) and Medrano-Adán et al. (2015) to account for the solo self-em-
ployed as a third occupational choice, and for management costs (Coase, 1937; 
Rosen, 1982). In this section, we briefly describe the model and main results, 
and explain the relationship between the predictions of the model and other 
related results in the literature on social capital-trust and entrepreneurship.
In the occupational choice models, individuals with different skills, 
general or entrepreneurial, choose to work as entrepreneur or as employee, 
depending on the income earned in each occupation (a function of skills). 
Production uses three inputs, labour from direct employees, capital services 
and entrepreneurial services. The entrepreneurial input enters the produc-
tion function in two ways, as part of the total factor productivity compo-
nent of the production function and as a management input that supervises 
the execution of strategic decisions. The production function that captures 
the assumptions of the occupational choice theory is formulated as follows 
(Rosen, 1982; Medrano-Adán et al., 2015):
Where e is the level of skill of the entrepreneur, K is the capital input 
and L is the direct labour input. The term g(e), increasing in e, is the con-
tribution of the entrepreneur input to the total factor productivity of the 
production unit from the quality of the strategic decisions (higher quality 
increases the productivity of all inputs directed by the entrepreneur). The 
function F
(
K,L
)
 is increasing and linear homogeneous in capital and la-
bour (constant returns to scale). The parameter 0≤훽≤1 is the degree of or-
ganizational size diseconomies resulting from the cost of the entrepreneur 
Y=g (e) e훽
[
F
(
K,L
)]1−훽
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directing the allocation of the two resource inputs, labour and capital, i.e. 
diseconomies of size in the management costs, in the terminology of Coase 
(1937). This is also the key parameter in our analysis of the number of en-
trepreneurs and social capital. A value of the parameter β lower than one 
implies that the term 
[
F
(
K,L
)]1−훽
 has decreasing returns to scale in labour 
and capital. Since the skills of the entrepreneur e are fixed, when the en-
trepreneur chooses K and L that maximize profits for given input and out-
put prices, the output and profits are positive and increasing with skills e. 
Individuals working as employees only earn the market-determined salary 
(Medrano-Adán et al., 2015).
In the market equilibrium from occupational choices, no individual 
wants to change occupation and the supply of employees is equal to the de-
mand from entrepreneurs-employers. In this solution, highly skilled individ-
uals work as entrepreneurs-employers and less skilled ones as employees. The 
average productivity of entrepreneurs is measured by the average span of con-
trol, i.e. the number of employees per entrepreneur. The fewer the number 
of entrepreneurs the higher the average span of control and the higher the 
average size of firms when number of entrepreneurs and number of firms co-
incide. Comparative static analysis in the market equilibrium gives the result 
that higher value of parameter β, i.e. higher organizational size diseconomies, 
results in more entrepreneurs and smaller average span of control.
The extension of the model to three occupational groups—employees, 
entrepreneurs-employers and entrepreneurs solo self-employed—can give dif-
ferent results depending on the additional assumptions around the model. 
Salas-Fumás et al. (2014) show that, in the equilibrium, individuals who volun-
tarily choose solo self-employment have skills intermediate between those 
choosing to work as employees and those working as employers. The compar-
ative static analysis shows now that higher β implies a higher number of both 
solo self-employed and employers, in the new equilibrium. Medrano-Adán 
et al. (2015) solve for the occupational equilibrium in an economy with three 
occupational groups and a minimum wage. The market equilibrium now in-
cludes two groups of solo self-employed, those who voluntarily choose solo 
self-employment, with relatively high skills and income, and those who invol-
untarily become solo self-employed, with skills lower than the minimum skills 
at which a person finds a job as employee and earns the minimum wage.2 In 
this equilibrium, the comparative static exercise shows that the number of 
2The minimum wage is one of several possible reasons for the existence of the involuntary solo 
self-employed. The key point is that there can be legal (minimum wage), economic (tax 
evasion), and technical (minimum skills required for use of certain technologies) factors 
determining the number of involuntary solo self-employed. The model confirms that the 
contribution to total output of the voluntary solo self-employed, with middle-to-high 
levels of skill and income, is greater than the contribution from low-skilled and low-in-
come involuntary self-employed individuals.
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voluntary solo self-employed individuals increases with β, while the involun-
tary solo self-employed decreases with β.
2.2 Management cost, Size Diseconomies and Social Capital
The next hypothesis to explain cross-country differences in the relative sizes 
of occupational groups and the average span of control is that differences 
in social capital, as a support of generalized trust, imply differences in the 
value of the parameter β, the degree of organizational size diseconomies 
from management costs. Specifically, the hypothesis is that, in environ-
ments of higher social capital and generalized trust, management systems 
and organizational designs will involve greater decentralization of decisions 
to lower levels of the hierarchy, saving in intensity in the use of inputs from 
the management-supervision function of the entrepreneur. Therefore, pro-
duction in countries with higher social capital and trust will take place in 
organizations whose management technology will have lower values of pa-
rameter β than the management technologies dominating in countries with 
lower social capital and lower generalized trust.
Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Aghion et al. (2014) formally prove that 
optimal decentralization of decision-making in hierarchical organizations 
is greater in high trust environments because collaboration among special-
ists will take place in conditions of higher goal congruence. Gur and 
Bjornskov (2017) find a strong positive association between trust and dele-
gation in cross-country data, but only for developed countries. Bloom et al. 
(2012) find that multinational companies with headquarters in high-trust 
countries delegate more decisions to managers of their foreign subsidiaries 
than multinationals with headquarters in low-trust countries, and attribute 
this result to the theoretical results of Aghion and Tirole (1997).3 La Porta 
et al. (1997) report empirical evidence of the positive association between 
the level of generalized trust in a country, and the relative importance of 
large firms in this economy, which can also be interpreted as evidence that 
trust lowers the agency costs of delegation and consequently it lowers the 
management costs of firms’ growth. Kummar et al. (2002) explain differ-
ences in firm size across-countries and include institutional variables, such 
as protection of property rights, as potential determinants of cross-country 
differences in the sizes of firms. Since generalized trust reduces the cost of 
contracting because trust supports the use of implicit contracts to govern 
3Bloom et al. (2012) develop a theory section explaining the equilibrium number of entrepre-
neurs from occupational choices, only employees and entrepreneurs with employees, 
when managers help to solve operational problems (Garicano, 2000; Garicano and 
Rossi-Hansberg, 2006), rather than in supervising the execution of strategic decisions 
(Rosen, 1982), assumed here. They predict an effect of higher trust on the equilibrium 
number of managers similar to what we predict here for employers.
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economic transactions (Kreps, 1990; Williamson, 1993; Glaeser et al., 2002), 
in environments of higher trust the protection of property rights can be 
easily done by implicit contracts, which again lowers the costs of growth. 
Cingano and Pinotti (2016) document that trust-based delegation makes 
firms more efficient and contributes to a shift in the size distribution from 
smaller to larger size classes.
All these theoretical and empirical results lead us to hypothesize that 
diseconomies of size from management costs, the value of parameter β in 
the model, will decrease with the level of social capital as support of gen-
eralized trust in the economy. Then, taking into account the predictions 
from occupational choice models on how different values of the parameter 
β affect the relative size of the occupational groups in the equilibrium, we 
predict that: (i) countries’ social capital will be negatively associated with 
countries’ rate of entrepreneur-employers, and positively associated with 
countries’ average span of control; (ii) the relationship between social capi-
tal and the rate of solo self-employed is undetermined: a positive (negative) 
association will indicate that the effect of differences in social capital on 
the rate of voluntary solo self-employed is higher (lower) than the effect of 
differences in the rate of involuntary solo self-employed.
We notice that these hypotheses, although related to the literature on 
trust, delegation, and the size of firms, incorporate important differences. 
First, our unit of analysis is not the firm as a legal entity, but the physical per-
son of the entrepreneur. Management costs result from the coordination and 
supervision function of the entrepreneur and are independent of constituting 
a legally independent entity, a corporation, or not. If the number of employers 
in a country were the same as the number of legally independent firms, then 
the average size of firms and average span of control would coincide, but this 
is not necessarily the case and, often, entrepreneurs conduct business with 
several legal entities (Salas-Fumás and Sanchez-Asin, 2013a). Average span of 
control is a variable more closely related to the predictions of the theory than 
the average size of firms, because the boundaries of firms that matter in the 
context of the model are those determined by the unit of command, not by the 
property rights over the assets of the legal entity. Second, our hypotheses 
come from economy-wide equilibrium solutions so they do not apply to the 
size or growth of individual firms; we formulate and test hypothesis with 
country level data on the respective sizes of occupational groups. Finally, we 
distinguish between those self-employed who do, and those who do not, hire 
employees, a distinction not made in the referenced literature.4
4The paper focuses on the relationship between social capital and the number and productiv-
ity of entrepreneurs in the economy. It leaves out the detailed reference to research on 
how social capital and trust affect economic development (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Zak 
and Knack, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Pérez García et al., 2006; Akçomak and 
ter Weel, 2009; Peiró-Palomino and Tortosa-Ausina, 2015).
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2.3 Entrepreneurship and Social Capital
A large body of entrepreneurship research has investigated the link between 
social capital and entrepreneurship (Westlund and Bolton, 2003; Gedajlovic 
et al., 2013; McKeever et al., 2014). The most common conclusion of this 
research is that countries and regions with higher levels of social capital are 
also regions with higher rates of new firm creation (Westlund and Adam, 
2010; Bahmani et al., 2012; Estrin et al., 2013; Westlund et al., 2014) and 
regions with relatively more individuals involved in creating new firms 
(Bahmani et al., 2012).
Kwon and Arenius (2010), with GEM data from several countries, 
provide evidence that trust supports entrepreneurship because in environ-
ments of high trust there will be more business opportunities and it will 
be easier for the new ventures finding external finance. Social capital and 
trust broadly contribute to creating a fertile ground for the flourishing of 
entrepreneurial activities. It facilitates information diffusion and technol-
ogy adoption, and eases access to labour and capital inputs, including in-
formal finance, especially in the start-up phase (Baron et al., 2010; Bosma 
et al., 2004; Guiso et al., 2004; Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007; Michelacci 
and Silva, 2007; Alexy et al., 2012).
The literature on entrepreneurship predicts a positive association be-
tween the countries’ social capital and entrepreneurial activity levels be-
cause social capital works as a ‘lubricant’ (Arrow, 1974) that facilitates the 
access to information and resources, especially to new entrepreneurs. In 
this paper, we predict that higher social capital will be associated with fewer 
and more productive entrepreneurs. One way to explain the different predic-
tions is by the fact that the literature on entrepreneurship adopts the view 
of the entrepreneur proposed by Schumpeter, while in this paper we adopt 
the view of the entrepreneur proposed by Coase. For Schumpeter the en-
trepreneur and entrepreneurial activities (entry of new firms, exit of exist-
ing ones and changes in occupations…) are synonymous of disequilibrium 
and creative destruction. In contrast, the Coasian entrepreneur contributes 
to social order and coordination. In fact, occupational choice models pre-
dict the number of entrepreneurs in the market equilibrium but say nothing 
about the transition between equilibriums. The exception is Hopenhayn 
(2016) who models a dynamic process of entry and exit of firms where en-
trepreneurs learn by experience about their entrepreneurial skills that con-
verges to the static occupational choice equilibrium. Then, an economy can 
be considered highly entrepreneurial because it shows a high rate of entry 
and exit of entrepreneurs starting and closing businesses, and at the same 
time with a relatively small number of entrepreneurs (capital stock) in the 
stationary equilibrium.
Finally, the view on how social capital contributes to wealth creation 
in the entrepreneurship literature does not make a clear distinction between 
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social capital as a ‘bridging’ (Bourdieu, 1980; Burt, 1982) or as a ‘bonding’ 
(Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995) asset, i.e. between internal and external so-
cial capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Bridging and external capital is a pri-
vate asset that benefits society through the private benefits of individuals or 
groups that own the asset, most often facilitating them the access to other 
private external resources, including those needed to become an entrepre-
neur. Bonding or internal social capital is a public good, freely accessible 
to all members of the community, which facilitates collaboration and ex-
changes (it lubricates the economic system in words of Arrow). Our paper 
is grounded in social capital as a public good, and its effects on economic 
efficiency are ultimately measured in terms of contribution to the produc-
tivity of the whole economy, not as a private gain.
3 data and econometrIc models
3.1 Data Sources and Variables
There are three endogenous or dependent variables, the relative sizes of oc-
cupational groups of employers and solo self-employed, and the average 
span of control of employers, each measured for a country and year. The 
main explanatory variable is the social capital and trust, also of a country 
and year.
The data on employers, solo self-employed and employees for each 
country and year come from the statistics published by the ILO in the ILO’s 
central statistics database ILOSTAT (2013). The number of countries for 
which data are available varies from year to year; our final database covers 
the period 1987–2011 (25 years) and up to 63 countries (incomplete panel 
data). The time period is conditioned by the availability of data on social 
capital. The ILO database contains information, for each country and year 
reported, on the number of individuals who are self-employed with em-
ployees (employers), the number of self-employed without employees (solo 
self-employed) and the number of employees. With this information, we de-
fine and measure the following dependent variables of the empirical model:
SEit = Share of self-employed with employees: the ratio between the 
number of employers and all occupied individuals (employers, solo self- 
employed and employees) of country i in year t.
SSEit = Share of self-employed without employees (solo self-employed): 
the ratio between the number of self-employed without employees and all 
occupied individuals (employers, solo self-employed and employees) of 
country i in year t.
SoCit = Average span of control: the ratio between the number 
of employees and the number of employers of country i in year t. This 
variable is interpreted as an indicator of the average productivity of 
entrepreneurs-employers.
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In an economy with only employers and employees, the variables share 
of employers, SE and average span of control, SoC, would be mutually de-
termined (SoC = (1–SE)/SE). With the existence of solo self-employed this is 
no longer the case because the solo self-employed enter into the calculation 
of the share of employers (denominator with all occupied individuals) but 
not in the calculation of the span of control.
The data on the main explanatory variable, the social capital of coun-
tries in a given year, come from the database elaborated by the Spanish 
Institute of Economic Research, IVIE. Social capital is expressed as an 
index, SCIit, social capital index for country i in year t, normalized so that 
the value for the year 2000 is set equal to 100. From the years 1987–2005, 
the data source is the web site https://www.ivie.es/es_ES/bases-de-datos/
diferencias-economicas-y-sociales-de-los-territorios/capital-social/, and 
for the years 2006–2011, the data on social capital come from the book of 
Fernández de Guevara et al. (2015). The continuity of the two data sources is 
assured because the same research team, using the same methodology, elab-
orates both databases. The methodology used in the calculation of the IVE 
social capital index follows the economic approach proposed by Glaeser 
et al. (2002). It is explained in detail in Pérez García et al. (2006), according 
to which, social capital is a stock that varies year by year by the net flow 
resulting from new investment in year t, and depreciation of the existing 
stock also in year t. The complication lies in the search for the right proxy 
variables to calculate the flow of new investment, and the depreciation rate. 
In the Appendix we provide more detailed explanation of the theoretical 
and methodological foundations of the IVIE social capital measure.
In the literature, it is common to find variables that are proposed as 
proxy measures of social capital in support of trust, such as associative 
density (Putnam, 1995), electoral turnout and blood donation (Guiso et al., 
2004) and the prevalence rate of social entrepreneurs (Estrin et al., 2013), 
where social capital is synonymous of level of citizenship. The IVIE-SCI 
belongs to the class of measures that can be used as being indicative of the 
level of trust in a country, in particular the trust resulting from calcula-
tions by rational individuals of the benefits and costs of trusting others. 
Pastor and Tortosa-Ausina (2008) document a positive association between 
the IVIE-SCI, as social capital that supports trust, and direct measures of 
individual perceptions of generalized trust, such as those obtained from the 
WVS survey. The IVIE-SCI has been used in other research studies (Pastor 
and Tortosa-Ausina, 2008; Miguélez et al., 2011; Salas-Fumás and Sanchez-
Asin, 2013b; Peiró-Palomino and Tortosa-Ausina, 2015).
The advantage of IVIE-SCI over other measures of generalized trust is 
the availability of data from a long list of countries and many years of time. 
Limitations may arise from the questioning of the proxy variables used to 
estimate the stock of social capital with measures of the flow of new in-
vestments and depreciations. We then complement the main results of our 
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analysis with a test of the hypothesis of the paper using the measure of trust 
provided by the World Values Survey (WVS, 2014) and the European Social 
Survey (ESS, 2014).
As advanced in the introduction, prior research has explained dif-
ferences in self-employed rates across countries using other explanatory 
variables, different from social capital and trust. We then add to the list of 
explanatory variables of our empirical model, control variables to account 
for other factors underlying differences in the size of occupational groups 
that could be correlated with the SCI. The variable unemployment rate of 
country i in year t, URit, capture the position of the country in the business 
cycle, together with possible structural differences in the functioning of la-
bour markets across countries (regulations, unemployment insurance). The 
variable UR is calculated with data from the ILO database as the number 
of unemployed divided by the active population (occupied plus unemployed 
persons).
The second control variable is the proportion of occupied individuals 
in agriculture for country i in year t, AGit. This variable captures differ-
ences in productive specialization across countries, which may determine 
differences in production technologies and in interpersonal relationships 
(in agriculture, it is more common to find a family business whose members 
will trust each other for reasons other than calculative trust). The variable 
AG is measured with data from World Bank statistics. The third control 
variable is the size of country i in year t, measured by the country gross 
domestic product GDPit. This variable controls for differences in specializa-
tion opportunities due to the incremental costs firms face when exporting to 
other countries, as well as for differences in competition intensity (the larger 
number of firms in the market makes collusion practices more difficult). 
The size of the national market is measured by GDP at constant 2005 $US, 
taken from the World Bank database.
Occupational choice models predict that occupational rates and output 
per occupied individual (proxy of per capita income) are jointly determined 
in the market equilibrium. Therefore, variables such as per capita income 
and the like are endogenous variables that should be excluded as determi-
nants of self-employment shares. However, there may be unobserved de-
terminants of the decision to delegate decision power in organizations that 
operate differently above a certain threshold of income (e.g. the education 
level of the population), which are worth controlling for. With this purpose 
in mind, we include as a forth control variable the dummy variable Richt 
that takes the value of 1 for countries with per capita income above the in-
come of the median country in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we control with time and country dummy variables for unob-
served common to all countries time varying effects and for idiosyncratic 
differences among countries, respectively. The time dummy variables ac-
count, among other things, for differences in the number of countries for 
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which information is available from year to year. The country fixed effects 
control for omitted variables that can have an effect on permanent differ-
ences in self-employment rates across countries, and at the same time be 
correlated with the SCI; e.g. culture and tradition, quality of formal institu-
tions or size of the government budget.
3.2 Econometric Model
Occupational choice models predict that the relative sizes of each occu-
pational group will converge to market equilibrium values. We model the 
determinants of the occupational shares as if the observed values of the 
dependent variables were realizations of the variable along a time path of 
adjustments towards market equilibrium values. Let Y* be the equilibrium 
value of the variable (e.g. the share of employers, SEit) and let Yt be the cur-
rent value of the variable in year t. Then, we postulate the partial adjust-
ment process as follows,
where δ is a positive parameter that depends on the costs of adjustment 
(non-observable and to be estimated). The equilibrium value Y* is assumed 
to be a function of the social capital index (SCI) and of the control variables 
(cv): Y*(SCI, cv). Substituting in [1] and arranging the terms:
The long-term value of the dependent variable Y*() is expressed as a 
linear function of the SCI and of the control variables, all lagged one time 
period to avoid simultaneity in the determination of their respective values. 
The SCI and the size of the market variables are introduced into the model 
in logs (Ln) to account for possible decreasing effects in the dependent vari-
able of changes in the value of the explanatory variable going from low to 
high values. The complete empirical model is then the following:
Where ηi is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation 
belongs to country i, and 0 otherwise, Dt is a time dummy variable and εit is 
the random error term.
Equation (3) is estimated for the three dependent variables defined 
in Section 2.1. The variables share of employers and share of solo self-em-
ployed are expressed in their logistic transformation, Ln (SEit/(1–SEit)) and 
Ln (SSEit/(1–SSEit)) respectively, so their values can go from minus to plus 
(1)Yt−Yt−1=훿
(
Y∗ −Yt−1
)
(2)Yt=(1−훿)Yt−1+훿Y
∗
(
SCI, cv
)
(3)
Yit= 휂i+훼1Yit−1+훼2LnSCIit−1+훼3URit−1+훼4AGit−1+훼5LnGDPit−1
+훼6Richt+훼7Dt+휀it
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infinity. The average span of control is measured in logs, Ln (SoCit). For 
consistency tests, we also estimate the long-term or stationary version of 
model [3], Y*(SCI, cv), where the lagged dependent variable is excluded from 
the explanatory variables. From the stationary equilibrium of the dynamic 
equation [3], the estimated coefficients of the long-term equilibrium model 
Y*(SCI, cv) are equal to those estimated from model [3] divided by (1–α1) = δ.
4 empIrIcal results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis
Our database is an incomplete panel data covering up to 63 countries for the 
25-year period between 1987 and 2011, for a total of 728 country-year obser-
vations and a minimum of eight countries per year. Table 1 presents the de-
scriptive statistics for the main variables of the model, number of countries, 
mean, median and standard deviation (SD) of the main selected variables: 
share of employers, SE, span of control, SoC, share of solo self-employed, 
SSE, unemployment rate, UR, Gross Domestic Product per capita, GDPpc 
and the Social Capital Index, SCI. The first number in the row ‘No. Obs.’ 
(‘No. Countries’) indicates the number of observations (countries) for which 
information on the values of the variables SE, SoC and SSE is available. 
The second number corresponds to the number of observations (countries) 
for which information on SCI is available. The statistics of each variable are 
calculated with all the observations available.
The number of country-year observations increases over time. The me-
dian of SE, share of employers, stays between 4 per cent and 5 per cent in all 
periods, while SSE, share of solo self-employed, stays around 17 per cent. 
The average unemployment rate, average UR is close to 8 per cent stable 
over time. The median of the number of employees per employer (SoC) stays 
between 18 and 37. The median GDPpc rises over time from $14,000 at the 
outset to $20,500 by the end of the period. The value of SCI is normalized, 
assigning a value of 1 to the original variable in year 2000, and adjusting ac-
cordingly. The median SCI in each sub-period shows a positive trend until 
2006. In the final sub-period, the median of the observations decreases, 
probably due to the economic crisis.
Table 2 presents the descriptive information from the values of the vari-
ables used in the estimation of our econometric models. The mean, median 
and SD of the variables are consistent with those of Table 1. Notice that SCI 
is negatively correlated with self-employment shares (SE and SSE), unem-
ployment rate (UR) and with the proportion of employment in agriculture 
(AG), but uncorrelated with the span of control (SoC), the size of the coun-
try (GDP) and the dummy variable (Rich). The correlation between SE and 
SSE is negative but small; SE is negatively correlated with the proportion 
of agricultural workers and positively with Rich. On the other hand, SSE is 
positively associated with UR and AG, but negatively with the size (GDP) 
© 2018 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
The Manchester School16
and wealth (Rich) of countries. The variables Rich and GDP are positively 
correlated, while AG and Rich are negatively correlated.
fIg. 1. GDP pc and Sel f -empl oyment  Shar es: Al l  Obser vat ions 1987–2011.
y = 0.0025ln(x) + 0.0214
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With the exception of the correlation between Rich and the proportion 
of agricultural workers, close to −0.7, the rest of simple correlations in Table 
2 are relatively small in absolute values. The highest correlation in absolute 
value is that between SCI and the unemployment rate, −0.19, probably be-
cause the unemployment rate enters in the IVIE’s calculation of social cap-
ital. However, the value of the correlation is sufficiently low for not having 
to care about multicollinearity problems. Another remarkable result is the 
quite small correlation (significant only at p < 10 per cent) between SE and 
SSE, and the different sign of the correlation between Rich and SE (posi-
tive) and SSE (negative). These results confirm, once again, the importance 
of treating the self-employed as a heterogeneous group.
The opposite signs in the association between employers (SE) and solo 
self-employed (SSE) rates and per-capita income are more visible in Fig. 1. 
Other papers have presented a plot similar to Fig. 1(c), with the negative 
association between self-employment shares, as a homogeneous group 
(SE + SSE), and per-capita income (Gollin, 2008; Wennekers et al., 2010), 
but the Fig. 1(a) and (c) on per capita income and separate self-employment 
rates for employers and for solo self-employed, are new in the literature. 
Table 3 shows a summary of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory 
variable GDP per capita in logs, Ln(GDPpc), in simple regressions with two 
dependent variables: rate of employers, SE, and rate of solo self-employed, 
SSE, both for selected five-year sample periods, in the time interval 1987–
2011. In all estimations, the rate of employers (SE) is independent of the 
level of economic development (every estimated coefficients of GDP per 
capita are close to zero and not statistically significant). On the other hand, 
the estimated semi-elasticity of the rate of solo self-employed (SSE) with 
respect to GDP per capita is always negative, statistically significant and 
with a value close to −0,065 in all estimations. The relationship between 
self-employment rates and economic development, measured in terms of 
per capita income, appears to be very stable over time.
table 3  
estImated coeffIcIents of the varIable ln (gdpc) for dependent varIables se and sse: 
selected fIve-year perIods 1987–2011
Period No. Observations No. Countries SE SSEi
1987–91 48 14 0.0005 −0.0600***
1992–96 123 37 0.0107 −0.0635***
1997–01 231 60 0.0037 −0.0653***
2002–06 294 65 0.0011 −0.0656****
2007–11 295 68 0.0008 −0.0671***
Source: Own elaborations. SE, and SSE, ILO database; GDPpc World Bank.
***p < 1 per cent.
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Figure 2 shows the time evolution of SE (2a) and SSE (2b) for four 
countries, one from each quartile of per-capita income: Thailand, Panama, 
Spain and Japan. Countries with large differences in per-capita income, e.g. 
Japan and Thailand, have relatively similar shares of employers, but very 
different shares of solo self-employed. Japan is the only country where the 
fIg. 2. Time Evol ut ion of  Shar es of  Empl oyer s and of  Sol o Sel f -empl oyed f or  Sel ect ed 
Countries, from Low First Quartile to High Fourth Quartile of GDPpc.  
Notes: GDPpc in Year 2011 Constant $ and PPP 2005: Thailand 3,158.07, Panama 6,694.08, 
Spain 25,240.85 and Japan 36,203.43.
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shares of employers and of solo self-employed show a decreasing trend over 
time. In Spain, the share of solo self-employed decreases over time, but the 
share of employers has been stable for the last twenty years. In the less- 
developed countries of Thailand and Panama, both the share of employers 
and the share of solo self-employed remain quite stable over time.
4.2 Results of Estimating the Regression Models
We now show, in Table 4, the results of the estimation of model [3] on the 
determinants of self-employment rates, separately for employers (SE) and 
solo self-employed (SSE), as well as that on the determinants of the average 
span of control (SoC). For each dependent variable, we estimate two equa-
tions. The first, with the lagged dependent variable as explanatory, short-
term model, assumes that the observed values of the respective dependent 
variable are transition values that adjust over time towards a conditional 
desired equilibrium value. The second, without the lagged dependent vari-
able, long-term model, considers that the observed values of the dependent 
variable are equilibrium values.
The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is rela-
tively high and statistically significant in all estimations, indicating that 
the adjustment process towards the equilibrium is relatively slow, i.e. all the 
dependent variables show high persistence over time. In particular, the esti-
mated time to convergence from the current to the desired value of depen-
dent variables Share of Employers (SE) and average Span of Control (SoC) 
are approximately three years (1/δ = 1/(1−0.64)); while it is approximately 
four years (1/δ = 1/(1−0.77)) for the Share of Solo Self-employed (SSE).
As expected from the theory, the estimated coefficient of the Social 
Capital Index (SCI), in the equation of determinants of the rate of employ-
ers (first two columns of Table 4), is negative and statistically significant. 
The empirical evidence confirms that higher levels of social capital imply 
lower relative numbers of employers among all occupied individuals, as 
predicted in Section 2. When the dependent variable is the average span 
of control (SoC), the estimated coefficients for the SCI practically equal 
those estimated when the dependent variable is the rate of employers but 
with opposite sign (two central columns of Table 4). The reason why the 
information in the dependent variable SE can be different from the infor-
mation in the variable SoC is that in the calculation of the share of em-
ployers intervenes the number of solo self-employed while in the latter the 
solo self-employed do not intervene. Then, the equality in absolute values 
of the estimated coefficients for the two dependent variables indicates that 
cross-country differences and time evolution of solo self-employment rates 
have minor influence in the equilibrium rates of employers and employees. 
This would be consistent with the hypothesis that, in most of the countries 
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in the database, the largest differences in the self-employed rates occur in 
the group of involuntary solo self-employed.
From the partial adjustment model of the employers’ share, the esti-
mated coefficient for the variable SCI in the long-term equation is −0.104/
(1−0.647) = −0.249, very close to that estimated directly in the long-term 
equation of −0.254. Therefore, the two estimations are mutually consistent. 
The same happens with the estimated values of the coefficients of the re-
spective variables in the model of span of control.
The last two columns of Table 4 show the estimated coefficients of 
the explanatory variables when the dependent variable is the share of solo 
self-employed. The time persistence of the values of the dependent variable 
is now even higher than with the previous two dependent variables (esti-
mated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable equal to 0.77). In the 
partial adjustment model, none of the estimated coefficients of the other 
explanatory variables, including SCI, is statistically significant. However, 
in the long-term equilibrium equation, the estimated coefficient of the SCI 
is negative and statistically significant.
Results are now different in the short- and long-term specifications, 
suggesting that the over-time high persistence in solo self-employed shares 
impedes the finding of any significant short-term effect of the explanatory 
variables. The estimated fixed effects capture the cross-section and perma-
nent differences in shares across countries. In the long run, differences in 
SCI do indeed imply differences in the equilibrium rates of solo self-em-
ployed. The negative estimated coefficient of the SCI variable in the rate of 
solo self-employed equation is consistent with the prediction from Section 2 
(theory), that lower organizational size diseconomies imply lower voluntary 
solo self-employment rates in the occupational choice equilibrium.
As for the estimated coefficients of the control variables, our results 
show that the shares of employers (the average span of control) are inversely 
(directly) related to unemployment rates and to the relative size of employ-
ment in agriculture. Therefore, in the long-term, the equilibrium average 
span of control is higher in countries with a higher structural unemploy-
ment rate, and a higher proportion of individuals working in agriculture. 
Controlling for the idiosyncratic differences (fixed effects) of countries, the 
long-term span of control-average productivity of entrepreneurs, is higher 
in countries with a high proportion of individuals working in agriculture (a 
proxy for economic backwardness).5 This result suggests that, in less- 
5Notice from Table 2, of simple correlations among the variables, that the proportion of indi-
viduals occupied in agriculture is negatively correlated with the Rich dummy, and posi-
tively with solo self-employed rates. The non-statistically significant coefficient of the 
variable AG in the solo self-employed equations suggests that there are idiosyncratic 
country-specific factors that jointly determine the employment in agriculture, the level 
of economic development, and the rates of solo self-employed. These idiosyncratic fac-
tors are not taken into account in calculating the simple correlations.
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developed countries, economic activity is polarized into two extremes, one 
with a relatively small number of large firms, and the other with small firms, 
mainly family ones, concentrated in agricultural activities (Hsieh and 
Olken, 2014). Notice also that the coefficient of the unemployment rate vari-
able is not statistically significant in the estimation of the share of solo 
self-employed. Therefore, there is no supportive evidence that solo self- 
employment is an occupation alternative for those people that do not find a 
job as employees.
Finally, we present some evidence on the economic relevance of the 
results. To shorten the exposition we focus only in the sensitivity of the span 
of control (SoC) variable to changes in the social capital (SCI), notice that 
the results with the variable SE would be similar although of opposite sign. 
Both variables, the span of control and the social capital, are expressed in 
logs. Then, the estimated coefficient of the social capital variable in Table 4 
is the elasticity of average span of control to social capital. In particular, the 
long term estimated elasticity of span of control of employers with respect 
to social capital is 25 per cent.
Thus, we can compare the average productivity of employers (average 
span of control) in a country with average social capital differing one stan-
dard deviation above of the sample mean. From Table 2, the sample mean 
of the SCI is 0.95 and the standard deviation is 0.38. Therefore, the country 
with social capital index one standard deviation above the mean will have 
a social capital index 40 per cent higher than that of the country in the 
sample mean (0.38/0.95 = 0.4). As the elasticity of span of control to social 
capital is 25 per cent, the country with social capital one standard deviation 
above the mean will have an average span of control 10 per cent higher (25 
per cent × 0.4 = 10 per cent). We can also make across country comparisons 
using observed differences in social capital indexes. For example, the sam-
ple average of social capital index in Finland (1.5) doubles the Portugal’s 
sample average (0.75), therefore the expected average productivity of em-
ployers (span of control) in Finland will be 25 per cent higher than the av-
erage productivity of employers in Portugal (0.25 ×  (1.5−0.75)/0.75 = 25 per 
cent).
4.3 Robustness
The robustness analysis has two parts. First, we estimate the models in Table 
4 for different sets of explanatory variables and for separate sub-sample of 
countries. Second, we present results on determinants of self-employment 
rates and span of control with different measures of social capital-trust.
Since the IVIE social capital index is a compound value in whose cal-
culation intervene several macroeconomic variables, there could be some 
redundancy between the SCI variable and variables such as the unemploy-
ment rate, the proportion of agricultural workers or the level of country 
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wealth. To examine if these possible redundancies could affect the results 
of the estimations we have re-estimated the models in Table 4 with only so-
cial capital, and dummies of time and country fixed effects as explanatory 
variables. The estimated coefficient of the social capital variable in all the 
specifications tends to be smaller than the coefficient shown in Table 4. 
Therefore, the sensitivity of the dependent variables to changes in the social 
capital variable is higher when all control variables are included among the 
explanatory variables of the empirical model, as in Table 4, than when they 
are excluded.
We have estimated the empirical model with data from countries with 
per capita income less or equal to the median of the sample (223 obser-
vations and 32 different countries). When the dependent variables are the 
share of employers and the span of control, the estimated coefficient of 
the lagged dependent variable is smaller than the one reported in Table 4 
(close to 0.5). However, when the dependent variable is the share of solo self- 
employed then the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
similar to that for the whole data sample in Table 4. Therefore, both endog-
enous variables share of employers and the span of control adjust towards 
the desired values at a comparatively higher speed in low per capita income 
countries.
In this sub-sample, when the dependent variable is the span of control, 
the estimated coefficients of the social capital are 0.11 (p = 0.046) in the 
partial adjustment and 0.13 (p = 0.2) in the long-term estimations. It seems 
that, in the partial adjustment model, countries with low income per capita 
present an estimated coefficient of the social capital similar to the whole 
sample (Table 4). However, in the long-term regression model, the elasticity 
of average span of control to social capital appears to be smaller in coun-
tries with low income per capita than in the whole sample (Table 4). The 
conclusion is similar when the dependent variable is the share of employers. 
It can be that, the target values of the dependent variables average span of 
control and share of employers show more volatility in low-income coun-
tries than in high-income ones.
4.4 Results with Other Trust Variables
One key issue in empirical studies of trust, social capital and economic per-
formance is the measure of trust and social capital used in the analysis. 
In this section, we present an alternative empirical analysis of the relation-
ship between level of trust, and country rates and productivity of employ-
ers (span of control), with measures of trust different from the IVIE social 
capital index. We have collected cross-country data on generalized trust 
for countries in the sample from the World Values Survey (21 countries) 
database (WVS, 2014) and the European Social Survey (24 countries) data-
base (ESS, 2014). Data are available for intermittent years since 1999. The 
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measure of trust from the WVS is the proportion of individuals who re-
spond yes to the question of whether they generally trust others, while in the 
ESS the level of generalized trust is measured on a scale from 0 (low trust) 
to 10 (high trust). In order to obtain a homogeneous measure, and pool all 
countries in a single group, we standardize the values of the trust variables 
in the two sources (difference to the sample mean of the respective country 
value of the variable, divided by the standard deviation).
The trust values for each country from these surveys are very persistent 
and are available only for a small number of years. For this reason, we change 
the empirical analysis as follows. First, we estimate model [3] excluding SCI 
variable, for each of the three endogenous variables (SE, SoC and SSE). The 
estimated country fixed effects in each of the three models are the long-term 
estimated equilibrium values of rates of employers, of average span of control 
and of rate of solo self-employed, respectively, when the countries’ differences 
in social capital and trust are ignored. Next, we formulate and estimate three 
empirical models. The dependent variables are, respectively, the countries’ 
estimated fixed effects in the modified empirical model [3] for the rates of 
employers, span of control and rates of solo self-employed. The explanatory 
variable in the three models is the mean value of the standardized trust vari-
able of the corresponding country in the years from 1999 to 2011.
Table 5 presents the results of the estimated cross-section regression 
models. It shows two estimations, one with the pool of all 55 countries (All), 
and the other with a sub-sample of 24 European countries for which we have 
the responses from the ESS, i.e. the countries with a homogeneous measure 
of the trust variable. When the rate of employers and average span of con-
trol are the dependent variables, the estimated coefficients of the trust vari-
able are statistically significant and have the same sign as those of the 
estimated coefficient for SCI in Table 4. The estimated coefficient and its 
statistical significance are higher in the sub-sample of countries (ESS), per-
haps because the trust measure is now homogeneous across countries. When 
solo self-employed is the dependent variable, the estimated coefficient of the 
trust variable is not statistically significant. This lack of significance brings 
into question the robustness of the results in Table 4, where, in the long 
term, the rate of solo self-employed is negatively correlated with social cap-
ital. In any case, the empirical results highlight once again the importance 
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of separating the solo self-employed from entrepreneurs-employers when 
explaining differences in self-employment rates among countries.6
5 conclusIon
Entrepreneurship as self-employment shows ambiguous results when corre-
lated with economic development: total self-employment is proportionately 
higher in less-developed countries than in more developed ones, but the rate 
of employers, self-employed who hire employees, appears uncorrelated with 
the per capita income of countries. Evidence of this kind has led to the con-
clusion that not all entrepreneurs contribute equally to economic develop-
ment (Lerner and Schoar, 2010). This paper acknowledges the importance 
of distinguishing between heterogeneous entrepreneurs, solo self-employed 
and employers, but it focuses on the previous question of why countries 
differ in entrepreneurship as synonymous of self-employment. If rates and 
composition of self-employed are endogenously determined then, from a 
policy point of view, the relevant questions are what conditions favour the 
kind of entrepreneurship that has a higher positive impact on economic de-
velopment, and through what mechanisms.
The view of entrepreneurs in the occupational choice models is closer 
to the Coasian entrepreneur, the entrepreneur as an alternative to the price 
system for the direction of resources, than to the Schumpeterian entrepre-
neur, the entrepreneur as the main actor of innovation and creative destruc-
tion. In the Coasian’s world, there are transaction costs that explain why 
certain transactions take place in markets and why some transactions take 
place within firms. Arrow’s (1974) view of trust as a ‘lubricant’ of the econ-
omy can be interpreted as considering trust a social institution that can save 
in transaction costs and ultimately increase overall economic efficiency. 
However, little is known on whether social capital contributes to economic 
efficiency equally as lubricant of market-mediated transactions than as lu-
bricant of entrepreneurs-mediated transactions. If trust lowers the transac-
tion costs of markets and firms in similar amounts then differences in trusts 
across countries would had no effect in the respective distribution of firm 
sizes. However, the evidence in this paper shows that trust is positively cor-
related with the average productivity of entrepreneurs (larger average span 
of control of employers and fewer entrepreneurs in countries with higher 
6Additional robustness analyses of the results of Table 4 include different ways of calculating 
the values of the dependent variable. First, the share of employers is calculated as em-
ployers over the economically active population (total employment plus unemployment). 
This definition of the variable would be consistent with the hypothesis that unemploy-
ment is an additional occupational choice, voluntary or involuntary. We have estimated 
the first two columns of Table 4 with the new definition of the dependent variable and 
our main results remain unchanged (results available upon request). The second varia-
tion consists in substituting the logistic transformation of the dependent variable em-
ployers’ share (SE) by its logarithm. Once again, all results and conclusions remain 
unchanged.
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trust), suggesting that trust favours more firm mediated than market medi-
ated transactions.
The explanation from the occupational choice theory of this result is 
that higher trust facilitates the adoption by entrepreneurs of organizational 
designs in their firms with higher delegation of decision making in lower 
levels of the hierarchy. The efficient delegation saves in intensity of super-
vision in the execution of the entrepreneurial decisions and entrepreneurs 
are in a better position to take advantage of the scale economies in skills in 
terms of quality of the decisions: better entrepreneurial decisions by more 
skilled entrepreneurs leverage the productivity of all resources under their 
direction, including the employees. In the market equilibrium with higher 
trust and more delegation the hierarchical control of employees by the em-
ployers is less intense, entrepreneurs of given skills can efficiently direct 
more resources and, ultimately, the market equilibrium involves fewer and 
more productive entrepreneurs (fewer firms and more transactions within 
firms and less between firms).
In entrepreneur-mediated transactions, higher quality of the entre-
preneurial decisions creates externalities in the form of increasing the pro-
ductivity of resources under the direction of the entrepreneur that do not 
happen in market mediated transactions. Management costs, the name that 
Coase uses to refer to the transaction costs of using the entrepreneur-firm 
in governing transactions, limit the growth of firms and explain why not all 
people work under the direction of the more skilled entrepreneur. In soci-
eties with higher levels of trust, entrepreneurs adopt more decentralized or-
ganization designs that lower management costs and simultaneously reduce 
the organizational size diseconomies and the internal costs of growth. This 
means that with higher trust, resources are relocated from smaller to larger 
firms under the direction of the more skilled entrepreneurs so more people 
benefit (leverage their productivity) from the scale economies of entrepre-
neurial skills considered in occupational choice models.
Traditional occupational choice models do not consider the solo 
self-employed as a third alternative occupational choice additional to em-
ployees and employers. The theoretical predictions on how higher level of 
generalized trust will affect the equilibrium number of solo self-employed in 
the occupational choice equilibrium are not as robust as the predictions on 
the productivity of entrepreneurs-employers (Medrano-Adán et al., 2015). 
Since the solo self-employed individuals do not hire employees, there are no 
scale economies effects from the quality of their entrepreneurial decisions. 
The empirical evidence presented in this paper shows some contradictory 
results: in the short run, solo self-employment rates appear independent of 
the level of generalized trust of countries, while in the long term the asso-
ciation is negative and statistically significant. In the sub-sample of low- 
income countries, the share of solo self-employed appears independent of 
the social capital index. This and other evidences suggests that the influence 
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of differences in social capital in the way production is organized in less 
developed countries is not so robust as it appears to be in more developed 
ones. This could be consistent with the finding of Gur and Bjornskov 
(2017) that the association between trust and delegation is weaker in less- 
developed countries than in more developed ones. In any case, further re-
search is needed to find out whether the effect of trust on the comparative 
transaction costs of market and firm mediated transactions is sensible or 
not to the level of economic development of the countries.
Finally, the benefits from more delegation and less hierarchical super-
vision in environments of generalized trust may go beyond those attributed 
to the higher productivity of entrepreneurs following from the scale econ-
omies of skills in the decision-making function of entrepreneurs. It has 
been documented that the adoption and use of information and communi-
cations technologies contributes more to productivity in decentralized or-
ganizations than in centralized ones (Brynjolfsson et al., 1994; Bresnahan 
et al., 2002; Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Bloom et al., 2012). Globalization increases 
the competition among firms located in distant countries and regions; firms 
located in countries and regions endowed with low social capital will be at a 
competitive disadvantage with respect to those operating in environments of 
high social capital, because the latter will be able to jointly implement a de-
centralization of decision power and more intensive use of ICT.
appendIx: the IvIe Index of socIal capItal
The IVIE index of social capital is based on the idea that reciprocity, the cultural 
rule of ‘tit for tat’, justifies investing in reputation and, once reputation is build, it 
can be used as collateral in tacit agreements that govern economic transactions. 
People need assurances about what the behaviour of transaction partners will be 
under certain circumstances. The common instrument to protect from hazardous 
behaviour in transactions is the contract. Contracts can be explicit and complete, 
and implicit and incomplete. In general, information asymmetries make explicit-
complete contract more expensive in terms of transaction costs than the implicit-
incomplete ones. For this reason, societies that can rely more generally on implicit 
contracts to govern transactions will be more prosperous than otherwise because 
their economic system will function with lower transaction costs. The view of trust 
as lubricant of the economic system, Arrow (1974), means that, when trust is gener-
alized, collaboration and exchange takes place more under self-fulfilling mutual 
promises and cooperative behaviour, and less under the threat of denounces in 
courts.
Economists have formalized this idea with modelling the so-called ‘trust game 
with repetition and uncertain end play’ (Kreps, 1990). The best social outcome of 
the posed transaction situation requires one party be trustworthy to the other and 
that means convincing to the party whose trust is demanded (accepting her promise 
that will honour the trust) that it is in the best interest to honour the promise than 
to abuse it. The trade-offs that the party appearing trustworthy must manage in-
clude a short-term gain of abusing on the one hand, and the present value of 
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expected gains from future repeated transactions that, from the reciprocity rule, 
will be lost from the moment that there is an abuse and the trusted person collects 
the short-term gain. When a trustee honours the promise the short-term gain she 
renounces to is the cost of investing in reputation; in exchange, the trustee holds the 
expectation of renewing the trustworthiness in future profitable transactions so the 
net present value of the investment is positive.
What the developers of the IVIE index of social capital do, following Glaeser et 
al. (2002), is to operationalize the calculation of the pay-offs of the trust game and 
determine the investment in reputation that is optimal for a representative individ-
ual in every moment in time, i.e. it maximizes the economic value of the resulting 
stock of social capital. Next, they aggregate the individual social capital into a col-
lective measure of social capital in the form of one public good whose benefits for 
everyone are in the form of saving in transaction costs from participating in produc-
tion and exchange activities. The collective capital stock is equal to the product of 
the social capital of the representative individual times the opportunities to partici-
pate in transactions that this individual has in one to one basis (its personal network 
of relations), and times the number of potential people with whom the person inter-
acts. The contribution of the IVIE research team is in identifying a set of observable 
socio-economic variables that can be used to calculate the individual and the collec-
tive stock of social capital services. The social capital is an asset (it has economic 
value) with economic life of more than a year that varies over time with the net dif-
ference between the new investments flows and the economic depreciation of the 
stock, as it happens with other tangible assets of the economy.
In the original methodological paper (Pérez García et al., 2006), the analytical 
formalization of the individual investment problem and the aggregation to get the 
social capital of the economy-territory as a public good that facilitates the use of 
implicit contracts in transactions are summarized in two equations, the first order 
condition of the optimal individual investment, and the aggregation to the stock of 
capital services of the economy (public good):
where ks*t is the capital stock of the representative individual of the economy in 
period t and Is∗
t
 is the optimal investment flow in this capital in period t by the rep-
resentative person. β is the elasticity of output to the stock of social capital of the 
economy (estimated empirically from the production function of the economy). λ is 
the measure of how installed is the reciprocity rule in the economy, assumed to be 
one. Nt is the number of persons working in the economy. yt is the GDP of the 
economy. 
−
wt is the opportunity cost per unit of time spend in investing in social 
capital approximated by the average wage per employee of the economy. C� (Is∗
t
) is 
the marginal cost of the investment in social capital, proxied inversely by the share 
of population with at least secondary education. Is∗
t
 is the optimal investment flow 
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in this capital in period t by the representative person. G is the risk of getting ex-
cluded from participating in economic exchanges, measured by the GINI coeffi-
cient of income inequality. ρ is the real interest rate of the economy (time discount 
rate) assumed equal to 4 per cent. δ is one minus the depreciation rate of the social 
capital (inversely related to the unemployment rate). T is the life expectancy of the 
economy. c is the degree of interconnectedness of the representative person in the 
economy (measured by the ratio of bank loans over the GDP of the economy).
The stock of social capital used in this paper is an aggregate for the whole econ-
omy calculated from the expressions above with the listed proxy variables and nor-
malized to the value of one in year 2000. The stock is referred to end of the year and 
is available for different number of years depending on the country (incomplete 
panel data).
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